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i. Introduction

Water Quality Regulation

and California
Water Rights
An Analysis of Takings Issues
by Deborah L. Martin*

California's water tends to fall where and when it is needed the least. The majority of the state's precipitation falls during the winter months in northern areas of the state. The state's
population centers, and much of its irrigated agriculture, are in
the central and southern portions of the state. These areas need
water most during the dry summer months.' The state is also
prone to extended droughts, further parching the cities and
agriculture. Large reclamation projects, described below, have
been built by both the state and federal governments to quench
this thirst. Most of the water used in California is delivered
through these projects, and Is allocated by permit or contract
with either the state or the United States Department of the
Interior. Bureau of Reclamatlon3
These large-scale developments for water delivery have
enabled and encouraged the irrigated agriculture-centered
economy in the Central Valley and the population growth in the
Los Angeles basin. This growth has come at great expense to
the environment. The impounding and rerouting of water from
the northern region of the state to the central and southern
regions upset the natural hydrological balance, resulting in
serious degradation of water quality in the northern rivers and
the San Francisco BayiSacramento-San loaquin River Delta
(hereinafter 'Bay/Delta"). Efforts to preserve and restore the
environment by altering the water system have been met with
opposition from those interests benefitted by the current system.
This note will discuss the water quality standards proposed
by the Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter 'EPAK) for
the Bay/Delta and the Central Valley Project Improvement Act
(hereinafter "CVPIA") as examples of proposed solutions to the
environmental problems exacerbated by poor water quality and
the opposition with which they are met. It will describe the
developed water system and its effect on the environment, discuss the proposed solutions to those environmental problems,
and then address the claims that these proposed solutions
result in unconstitutional takings of property.
If. Background
A. Reclamation Projects
There are two major water reclamation and delivery projects
in California- the Central Valley Project (hereinafter "CVP") and
the State Water Project (hereinafter "SP1). Both pump water
from the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta. The Sacramento
and San Joaquin Rivers meet at the Delta and flow west into the
San Francisco Bay. The rivers form an estuary mixing fresh water
with marine water through a series of bays. channels, shoals,
and marshes. Covering approximately 1600 square miles. this
area is habitat for over 120 fish species, and is one of the largest
3
areas of waterfowl habitat in the United States.
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The State Water Project delivers about 2.4 million
acre-feet annually (afa)4 through almost 700 miles of
canals, pipelines, and tunnels through and over 3000
feet of hills and mountains to southern California.5 The
water for the SWP comes from Lake Oroville on the
Feather River and surplus flows in the Sacramento-San
Joaquin Delta. 6 The amount of surplus flow water available from the Delta is dependent on hydrologic conditions and contingent on the satisfaction of water qual7
ity standards in the Delta.
The Central Valley Project captures the waters of
the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers and transports
them to farmers in California's massive, arid Central
Valley.8 Eighty-three percent of California's water is
used for irrigated agriculture 9 and the Central Valley is
the largest block of irrigable land in California, encompassing 6 million acres of irrigable land, 4.7 million of
which are actually irrigated.' 0 The CVP typically supplies approximately 7 million afa to Central Valley irrigation districts servicing 2.8 million acres of land."
These reclamation projects have been a major factor in making California and the Central Valley the
most diverse and productive agricultural region in the
world. The state produces over half of the nation's
fruits, nuts, and vegetables on only 3 percent of the
nation's farmland, 12 and exports $4.66 billion in farm
products.' 3 In 1991, the gross income from farming in
California was $17.9 billion. 14 When considered in
terms of the multiplier effect, the impact of agriculture
on the economy of California as a whole is enormous.
Farming and related activities generate $63.1 billion or
90.5 percent of California's $697 billion Gross State
Product. The food and fiber system also creates, directly and indirectly, 9.78 percent of total employment in
the state. Agriculture has an even greater impact on
the economy of the Central Valley. Farming and farm
related industries directly and indirectly create nearly
one-third of all jobs in the Central Valley and generate
about one third of personal income. Direct and indirect sales from farming add $50.8 billion to the Central
Valley economy, and the industries produce 27.2 percent of value-added dollars in the Central Valley."5

B. Environmental Effects
The water diversion from and resulting degradation of the Bay/Delta have created a human-made
drought in an area which once supported a unique and
diverse ecosystem.' 6 Pumping water through the projects has reduced the amount of water flowing through
the San Francisco Bay by about half.'7 In addition, the
projects' powerful pumps can, and in drought years
often do, reverse stream flows in the Delta. In 1987,
reverse flows occurred on about 280 days; In 1988, they
occurred on about 260 days.' 8 These reverse flows are
problematic because they confuse migrating fish, pull
small fish from hatcheries into the pumping plants,
and draw salt water from the bay into Delta marshes,
increasing their salinity. 19
Although not solely to blame, the projects are
largely responsible for the dramatic decline of
Bay/Delta fish and waterfowl. The four seasonal
Chinook salmon runs which migrate through the
Bay/Delta have been decimated. The winter run returning to spawn dropped from more than 200,000 fish In
the early sixties to only 341 in 1993, and the fish is now
listed as an endangered species. The spring run
dropped from 25,400 in the 1980s to 2,700 in 1993, arid
that species soon may be listed as well. The 1993 fall
run levels were less than 50 percent of those In the
1980s, and the late fall run dropped approximately 30
percent in the same period.2 0 Other fish species are
also in decline: the Delta smelt has been listed as a
threatened species, and striped bass have declined
from 3 million to fewer than 600,000. The five most
abundant species in the San Francisco Bay, the longfin
smelt, white catfish, American shad, threadfln shad,
and Sacramento split-tail, are also in serious decline, 21
The water projects also have effected profoundly on
California's waterfowl. The Bay/Delta and the Central
Valley wetlands comprise 60 percent of the critical wintering habitat of the Pacific Flyway's waterfowl. Ninetysix percent of these wetlands have been lost since
1850.22 The California duck population dropped from
7 million in 1980 to 2 million in 1985.23

3. 59 Fed. Reg. 810-01 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131)
(proposed Jan. 6. 1994).

DIVIsIONOF AGRICULTURE
AND NATURALRESOURCES,
LEAFLETNo 21,517, THE
MEASURE
OF CALIFORNIA
AGRICULTURE,
ITSIMPACr ON THESTATEEcoNomy, at 2

4, An acre-foot Is the amount of water It takes to cover a square
acre of land to a depth of one foot. approximately 325.851 gallons.
enough for the domestic needs of a family of five for one year.

(1992).

5. JOSEPH
L. SAXET AL., LEGAL
CONTROL
OFWATER
RESOURCES,
II. 621
(2d ed. 1991).
6. DWR BULLETIN,
supra note I. at 24.

13. Id. at 3.
14. Id.at 2.

15. Id.at 5.
16. Deborah Moore & WR. Zach Willey. Water In the American West
Institutional Evolution and Environmental Restoration In the 21st Century, 61 U

7. Id.

COLO. L REv. 775 (1991).

8. SAx ET AL., supra note 5. at 647-48. For an excellent discussion

17. Ste generally lane Kay. Dying Fishery Sign of Nature In Trouble, SF.
EXAmuNER.
Oct. 26. 1993 at A8.

of the CVP, see Harrison C.Dunning. Confronting the Environmental Legacy
of IrrigatedAgriculture in the West: The Case
of the Central Valley Project. 23 Em'L
L. 943 (1993).
9. DWR BULLETIN,
supra note 1.at 5,
I0. Id.at

II.

II. SAx ET AL., supra note 5. at 648.
12. HAROLD 0. CARTER
& GEORGE
GoLo.iAN. UNIvEESrrY OF CAUFORNIA

18. Id.
19. Id.: seealso DWR BULLETIN.
supra note I, at 69.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Moore & Willey. supra note 16. at 775,

minn lq .

dntn19

Ill. Proposed Solutions
A. The Central Valley Project Improvement Act
In 1991. the fifth year of a severe drought in
California, the CVPIA was introduced in the Senate to
24
address environmental damage caused by the CVP.
The Act was signed into law by then President George
Bush on October 30, 1992.25 Among other provisions.
the CVPIA deems use of water for fish and wildlife protection, mitigation, and restoration to be equal in priority to irrigation and domestic use.26 and places fish
and wildlife enhancement at a priority level one step
lower than irrigation and domestic use.27 (Although
not clearly stated in the Act, this distinction between
protection, mitigation, and restoration on one level.
and enhancement on another, implies that the project
is to be used for environmental enhancement going
beyond mere reparation of damages caused by the
CVP.28) The CVPIA further directs the Secretary of the
Interior to 'operate the Central Valley Project to meet
all obligations under State and Federal law, including
but not limited to the Federal Endangered Species
Act."29 The CVPIA states as a general goal the doubling
of anadramous fish runs in all CVP rivers (excluding
the San Joaquin which has been largely dewatered) by
the year 2002.30 The CVPIA also dedicates 800.000 afa
of CVP water to fish and wildlife purposes. 3' and mandates that water be set aside to satisfy tribal water
33
claims 32 and ameliorate wildlife and wetland areas.
In total, the CVPIA dedicates 1.2 to 1.3 million afa to
environmental purposes.
B. EPA-Proposed Water Quality Standards
The Bay/Delta is subject to the water quality control jurisdiction of the California State Water
34
Resources Control Board (hereinafter "SWRCB).
However. the SWRCB has not met its obligations to set
water quality standards under section 303 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (hereinafter
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-Clean Water Act). Section 303(c) of the Clean Water
Act provides that states must establish and revise
water quality standards and that those standards are
to be reviewed by the EPA. California did promulgate
such standards in 1978: those standards were
approved with reservations by the EPA. However, the
1978 standards failed to meet the goal of sustaining
the striped bass population and failed to prevent the
decline of several other fish species." Further, the
state failed to remedy the plan's shortcomings by making changes to the 1978 plan at the triennial reviews
required by the Clean Water Act. California developed
a new plan in 1991 which the EPA disapproved
because it also failed to protect the designated uses of
7
the Bay/Delta)
California has yet to promulgate a water plan for
the Bay/Delta that meets the requirements of the
Clean Water Act. Section 303(c)(4) of the Act requires
that when a state falls to promulgate a satisfactory
plan, the Administrator of the EPA must prepare and
publish proposed regulations establishing water quality standards to be implemented within 90 days."
There exists some debate regarding the authority of
the federal government to implement rules affecting
water allocations as water allocations are traditionally
matters within a state's sovereignty. This federal power
issue is beyond the scope of this Note. EPA standards
will be assumed either to pre-empt state law or simply
to stand In the place of the standards California is
required to promulgate under section 303 of the Clean
Water Act as if the state had promulgated the standards itself.3
In lanuary 1994. the EPA proposed rules establishing three sets of federal criteria to protect the designated uses of the Bay/Delta. These criteria are: I)
salinity criteria protecting the estuarine habitat and
other designated fish and wildlife uses: 2) salinity criteria to protect the fish spawning designated use in
the lower San Joaquin River; and. 3) salmon smolt survival index criteria to protect the fish migration and
cold freshwater habitat-designated uses in the estuary.10 It is not necessary to delve into the technical
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§ 13131c]141(1934)

25. Reclamation Projects Act. Pub L No 102-575 § 3406. 106 Stat
4601. 4714 (Oct. 30. 1992)

36 Sez59 Fed Reg 810-10. § A-C 11994) (to be codlfied at 50
CFR pt 1311 lprolo'edIan 6. 1994)

23. Id.

26. Id. § 3406(a1(1). 106 Stat. 4601. 4714
27. Id. § 3406ta)[21. 106 Stat. 4601. 4714-15
28. Dunning, supra note 8. at 961
29. Pub. L No. 102-575. § 3406(b), 106 Stat 4601. 4714 (Oct 30.
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details of these standards for this discussion of their
effect on water rights. However, it is important to note
that the EPA proposed that these criteria be implemented primarily through increases in Delta outflow.
The need for additional outflow is estimated at 540,000
afa on average and 1.1 million afa in critically dry years.
The EPA expects that the reductions in water deliveries necessary to increase Delta outflows will be allocated so that agricultural users will bear 80 percent of
the reductions, and urban users will bear the remain41
ing 20 percent.
IV. Claims of Unconstitutional Takings
A. The CVPIA

1. Impairmentof ContractClaims and Claims of Taking of
Property Without Compensation in Violation of The Fifth
Amendment
Irrigation and water districts have been in existence in California since the Irrigation District Act was
passed in 1897.42 These districts are state agencies
having broad authority, including the power of eminent domain, the power to levy taxes and sell bonds,
and the power to enter into contracts. In California,
districts contract with the state and federal governments for the delivery of water through the SWP and
CVP. 43 Most of these contracts are extremely long

term, spanning forty or more years.
The CVPIA-mandated water set-asides and the
Act's requirement that the CVP comply with the
Endangered Species Act in effect create a "regulatory
drought" for water contractors by reducing the amount
of CVP water available for delivery. Several irrigation
districts have brought suit against the Bureau of
Reclamation alleging, inter alia, that compliance with
the CVPIA results in an interference with their contract
rights without due process and a taking of their property without compensation in violation of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 44
The federal government's motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim on these Fifth Amendment
issues were granted by the District Court on very narrow grounds. Westlands Water District's claim of
impairment of contract was dismissed on grounds of
collateral estoppel as to the nature of the right conferred by the contract. The takings issue was dismissed
as to all plaintiffs on jurisdictional grounds, as the

court held that the claim should have been brought In
the Court of Claims. 4 ' Although dismissed by the court

on procedural grounds, these issues remain unresolved and worthy of discussion as the extent to which
water contracts may be affected by subsequent legislation. Specifically how environmental protection legislation impacts a large number of powerful water Interests controlling vast volumes of water.
Westlands Water District, the named plaintiff In
the case discussed above, obtained a judgment from
the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of California in 1986 compelling the Department of the
Interior (hereinafter "DOI") to perform Its 1963 contract
with the District for the delivery of CVP water.46 The
judgment was stipulated to by Westlands and the DOI
in a case regarding the availability of subsidized project water for application to excess lands under the
Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. The judgment provides that the contract between Westlands and the
DOI is a "'valid, enforceable and Implementable contract entitling the District through the end of 2007 to
water and other service as specified therein,' and further provided that 'the United States shall perform the
47
1963 contract'."
Plaintiff Westlands has twice sought enforcement
of the judgment to protect its 1963 water contract
against subsequent legislation. In a 1990 action,
Barcellos and Wolfsen v. Westlands Water District, Westlands
argued that the judgment required the DOI to sell
water for excess lands at the subsidized contract rate
rather than at full cost. 48 The court held that the stipu-

lated judgment was confined to its facts, and that the
challenged legislation requiring payment of full cost
for some of the water was not in conflict with the contract.49 In a 1993 action, Barcellos v. Wolfsen, Westlands

argued that the Endangered Species Act and the CVPIA
were unconstitutional violations of due process as
applied, because they violated a contractual priority to
water.' 0 The court found that the Westlands contract
did not confer an absolute vested right to water
immune to subsequent legislation."' These cases form
the collateral estoppel basis for the court's granting of
the instant motions to dismiss. The district court ruled
that Westlands could not relitigate the claim that the
right provided by their contract is an absolute vested
right to water which cannot, under any condition, be
altered by the Bureau of Reclamation's reasonable
actions taken pursuant to valid subsequent legislation.52 The court held that the only claims Westlands

41. Id.

42. Now codified at CAL WATER
CODE § 20,500 (West 19841.
43. CAL.WATER
CODE §§ 34,000-38,501 (West 1984). For a history of
Westlands and its contracts and politics, see Bryan Wilson. Westlands
Water District and Its Federal Water: A Case Study of Water District Politics. 7
STAN.ENvr. Li. 187 (1987/1988).
44. Westlands Water Dist, v. Department of Interior Case No. CVF-93-5327 OVA SSH (E D. Cal filed Feb. II, 1993).
45 Id

46. Barcellos & Wolfsen v. Westlands Water Dist, 899 F2d 814,819
(1990),

47. Id.

48,Id.at 820.
49. Id.at 826.
50. Barcellos v. Wolfsen, CV-F-79-106 OA (CD Cal unpublished
memorandum decisions June 18, 1993, September 9, 1993)
51.
Id.
52. Westlands Water Dist, v. Department of Interior, CV-F-93.5327
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can relitigate on this issue are: 1) the validity of the
CVPIA and Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act;
and. 2) whether the Bureau has correctly complied
with those acts so that the Bureau's actions In reducing deliveries to plaintiffs are not arbitrary or capricious.53

2. Analysis
In determining whether the CVPIAs effect on the
irrigation districts' contracts with the DOI constitute
an impermissible taking or violation of due process.
the initial inquiry looks to whether the contracts with
the Bureau vest a protectable property right in the districts.54 Since it has long been held that 'Irlights
against the United States arising out of a contract with
it are protectable property." the nature of that right
must be evaluated to determine specifically whether It
is subject to subsequent legislation.
In Bowen v. Public Agencies. the Supreme Court recognized precedent that contracts with the sovereign
are subject to subsequent legislation absent an
express waiver of sovereign authority." The Court recognized that while the government has the power to
enter into contracts which do confer vested rights and
has the duty to honor those rights, courts have
declined to find that 'a sovereign forever waives the
right to exercise one of its sovereign powers unless it
expressly reserved the right to exercise that power in
the contract."57 The Court stated that the government
retains the power to legislate, and contracts are subject to that power unless it is -surrendered In unmistakable terms."58 The Court further stated that "con-

tracts should be construed, if possible, to avoid foreclosing exercise of sovereign authority." 9
In Peterson v. Department of the Interior, the Ninth
Circuit applied the above language from Bowen v. Public
Agencies to contracts for water, in the context of the
Oww SSH at 20 (ED. Cal. unpublished Memorandum Opinion and
Order Re: Defendants and Defendants-in-lnterventlon Motion to
Dismiss Feb. 1i. 1994).
53. Id.at 19.
54. Peterson v. Department of Interior, 899 F.2d 799. 807 (9th Cir.
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Reclamation Reform Act's provisions regarding excess
landsAeo The court found that contractual arrangements. Including those to which a sovereign itself is
party: I) remain subject to subsequent legislation.61 2)
should be construed, if possible, to avoid foreclosing
of the sovereign authority.62 and. 3) should be irterpreted against the backdrop of the legislative scheme
authorizing the contracts, with ambigJties to be inierpreted In light of policies underlying that legislation. o3
The court found that there exists no absolute requirement that Congress must expressly reserve in a controlling statute the right to amend that statute or government contracts authorized by it.m
In Peterson, the contract at issue contained a clause
allowing that. in the event Congress should chanie the
reclamation laws. -the United States agrees, at the
option of the District, to negotiate amendments of
appropriate articles of this contract, all consistently
65
with the provision of such repeal or amendment"
The court read this provision not as a reservation of
the right to negotiate a contract that would be contrary
to the law as amended or repealed, but an option to
either renegotiate the affected terms of the contract to
avoid Inconsistency with the changed law. or terminate the contract.66 Peterson is established precedent in
the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere 7 However, the Ninth
Circuit has cautioned against "too liberal an interpretation of the residual sovereign power of the government to override its contractual commitments" so as
not to "eviscerate the government's power to bind
itself to contracts. "'
The rule that ambiguities in contract terms are to
be resolved In favor of retention of Congress* power to
legislate can be read as either an alternative to the
requirement of an express waiver of that power or as
an element of that requirement. Either interpretation
presents separation of powers issues. Such problems
a -corporation of the fruits actually reduced to possession of contracts
lawfully made.- or to repudiate Its own debts which constitute property
to the lender simply In order to save money Li Nlone of these limitations are applicable In the context of this fNote
59 11 at 52-53

1990).

60 Pirtn.8S9 F2d 799.807

55. Lynch v. United States. 292 US. 571. 579 (1934). Although
justice Brandeis. In holding that War Risk Insurance contracts were
property, was probably not considering environmental regulations, the
opinion states that "lals Congress had the power to authorize the
Bureau of War Risk Insurance to Issue them. the due process clause prohibits the United States from annulling them, unless. Indeed. the action
taken falls within the federal police power or some other paramount
power.- Id.The Court recognized that supervening conditions can authorize Congress to abrogate contracts In the exercise of the state's police
or other power.

61 Id at 807 (quoting 6-,-n. 477 US at 52)

56. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment.
477 U.S. 41.52 (1986).
57. Id.(quoting Merrion v. licarilla Apache Tribe. 455 US. 130. 148
(1982)).
58. Id.The Court did note that congress' exercise of the reserved
power is limited In that Congress does not have the power to take away
property already acquired under the operation of a charter, or to deprive

62- L.
63 Ed(citing Federal Housing Authorityv The Darlington. 358 US
84.87-8 (1958)1
64 Id at 803
65 Perton. 899 F2d at M9_
66 Id at8ll
67 Sez. rp. Acacia Villa v Kemp. 774 F. Supp. 1240 (CD Cal
1990). affd sub rP-raAlpine Ridge Group v Kemp. 955 F2d 1382 (9th Cir.
1992). gr/d cn cl'zr grreissub rn Cisneros v Alpine Ridge Group, 113
S,C 1989 (1993)
68 Madera Irrigation Dist. v, Hancock. 985 Fid 1397. 1401 (9th Cir
19931 (government did not violate districrs rights by changing terms of
contract upon renewal; term In renewal contract reserving right to modIfy contract pursuant to environmental legislation did not render the
contract Illusor)
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are unavoidable when an executive agency purports to
contractually waive the legislative branch's authority
to legislate. There is precedent for viewing a contracting agency operating under the executive as wholly
separate from the legislative arm of the government. In
Horowitz v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
the "United States when sued as a contractor cannot
be held liable for an obstruction to the performance of
the particular contract resulting from its public and
general acts as a sovereign."69 However, it has not
been resolved in either the Ninth Circuit or the
Supreme Court whether an agency can immunize a
party to a contract against Congress' power to legislate.70 This would amount to allowing an executive
agency to waive Congress' legislative power.
In Transohio Savings Bank v. Office of the Thrift
Supervision, the D.C. Circuit has held that agencies do
not have the authority to waive Congress' legislative
power unless that authority has been delegated to the
agency in "unmistakable terms."7' The court, however,
did not reach the issue of whether such a delegation
was constitutionally permissible. The plaintiff savings
and loan had contracted with the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation, and Congress subsequently passed legislation affecting the contract.
Plaintiff argued that the "government" could not repudiate its obligations. The court responded that
"Transohio's repeated references to 'the government'
as the other party to the contract obscure the difficult
questions the thrift's constitutional claims pose:
whether the executive agencies entered into a contract
that bound Congress, and whether the executive agencies had the power to enter into a contract that bound
Congress."7 2 To answer these questions, the court
looked to the language of the contract itself. Applying
the doctrine that waiver of sovereignty must be
expressed in unmistakable terms, the court found no
evidence that the contract term at issue was binding
on Congress. 7 3 The court then considered whether the
agency had the power to bind Congress, even if an
unmistakable waiver of sovereignty was included in
the contract. The court stated "we strongly doubt that
such a promise would be binding on Congress. That
agency promise would be ultra vires and unenforceable."74 The court "assumeldl without expressing a
view that Congress might, in a contract, surrender
aspects of its regulatory authority-though the
Supreme Court has recently said that a state may not
contract away 'essential attributes of its sovereignty,'
and long ago suggested that Congress may not
69, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925j.
70. Westlands Water Dist. v. Department of Interior,CV-F-93-5327
OWW SSH (E.D. Cal. unpublished Memorandum Opinion and Order Re:
Defendants and Defendants-in-lntervention Motion to Dismiss February
I 1,1994).
7 1.. 967 F.2d 598.621-622
72. Id.at 617,
73, Id,at 618.
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either."7' The court further stated that It "assumeld
again] without expressing a view that Congress might
delegate to an agency the power to contract away
Congress' regulatory power-though the Supreme
Court has never considered Ithe constitutional validity
ofl such a congressional delegation."76 The court
added that Congress cannot be found to have delegat77
ed such power unless the delegation was explicit.

These statements, although not binding on the
Ninth Circuit, do reinforce the Ninth Circuit's observation in Madera Irrigation District v. Hancock that "lilt Is
doubtful that the Secretary of the Interior could, by
"7 8
contract, waive the right of Congress to pass laws.

Thus, however the contract terms are interpreted, the
contracts cannot waive Congress' power to enact legislation. Such a contract term would be void as an ultra
vires act on the part of the Bureau as Congress has
made no express delegation of authority to the Bureau
to waive Congress' regulatory power. In the absence of
such a delegation, the contract terms cannot be read
to waive the legislative power of the sovereign. Even if
such delegation were to be made, its constitutionality
would be questionable. Thus, the CVPIA does not
interfere unconstitutionally with the water rights of
parties who have contracted with the DOI for CVP
water. Thus, the contracts are not immune to legislation affecting their terms.
B. EPA-Proposed Water Quality Standards

I. FederalTakings Law
Noted water law scholar Joseph Sax commented
that, given the state of takings law as it stood in 1990,
the only new water law regulation that would
prima facie raise a taking problem is a release
requirement: requiring existing appropriators to
make releases in order to augment Instream flows
for public purposes such as ecosystem protection
and public recreation. If the approprIator's property right were an unqualified one, such a requirement might well be viewed as 'physical Invasion,'
79
and would thus be compensable.
However, the taking problem Professor Sax feared
is not raised by the EPA's proposed water quality standards. The proposed standards are a de facto release
requirement. Although they do not require releases of
water under the control of the rights holders, the water
quality standards effectively remove water from their
74. Id.at 620.
75. Id.at 621 (citations omitted).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Madera, 985 F.2d at 1407 (Hall, I.. concurrlng),
79. Joseph L. Sax, The Constilution, Property Rights and the Future of
Water Law, 61 U. CoLo. L. REv. 257, 263 (1990).
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reach. But, the fact that the right to water in California
is not an unqualified property right allows such redistribution of water without compensation to the existing rights holders.
0
is the most
-Lucas v.-South Carolina Coastal Council&
recent Supreme Court decision on the takings question. -In,Lucas. the Supreme Court noted that takings
questions are normally decided on an ad hoc basis.
dependent on the facts of each case which determine
whether a regulation -goes too far" and constitutes a
taking.8' The Court held, however, that there are two
categories of regulatory action which result in prima
facie takings, not requiring a case-specific inquiry into
the the public interest advanced by the regulation in
question. 2 Those two categories are 'regulations that
compel the property owner to suffer a physical invasion of his property." and regulations which -denlyl all
83
.economically, beneficial or productive use of land."
Although Lucas holds that the public interests
advanced by the challenged legislation are not to be
considered in these two situations, it also holds that
no compensation is due if the property rights held are
not absolute. The Court stated:
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation
that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation
only if the logically antecedent inquiry into
the nature of the owner's estate shows that
the proscribed use interests were not part of
his title to begin with.8

terms of state property law. There is no prima fade taking requiring compensation if the title or right is not
absolute under state law. In situations where there is a
pre-existing limitation upon the right, compensation
Is not automatically required by the Fifth Amendment.
Where the right abridged Is not absolute, the takings test formulated in Lucas requires analysis of.
"among other things, the degree of harm to public
lands and resources, ... the social value of the daimant's activities and their suitability to the locality in
question. ... and the relative ease with which the

alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken
by the dalmant and the government...,'26 In balancing
these factors. "Itihe fact that a particular use has long
been engaged In by similarly situated owners" may
indicate the absence of a common-law prohibition,
but "changed circumstances or new knowledge may
make what was previously permissible no longer so."S8
This balancing test is not a radical departure from traditional takings analysis as applied to natural
resources.13
Thus, under Lucas. to determine whether or not a
natural resources use restriction constitutes a taking
requiring compensation, it is necessary not only to
look at "background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance "8 to determine the extent of
the property right held, but also to look at how courts
have balanced the relevant factors in similar cases
where the right has been determined not to be
absolute. An outline of these two inquiries is set forth
below.
2. State Bacfround Principlesof Property Law
In Sierra Club v. Departrmentof Forestry, the court held
that timber harvest plans for an old growth forest had
been improperly approved, and restrictions to protect
threatened animal species were held not to effect an
unconstitutional taking of property.lO The court determined that the regulation did not deny the owner all
economically beneficial use of the forest land. In
reaching this decision, the court discussed the possible takings problem inherent in wildlife protection regulations affecting the use of property. The court noted
that "this Istate appellatel district, the federal courts of
appeals, and appellate courts in our sister states have
generally relected the claim that a state or federal
statute enacted In the interest of protecting wildlife is
unconstitutional because it curtails the uses to which

The Court further stated:
Where "permanent physical occupation" of
land is concerned, we have refused to allow
the government to decree it anew (without
compensation), no matter how weighty the
asserted "public interests" involved, though
we assuredly would permit thie government to
assert a permanent easement that was a preexisting limitation upon the landowner's
title .... Any limitation so severe cannot be
newly legislated or decreed (without compen,sation), but must inhere in the title itself, in
the restrictions that background principles of
the State's law of property and 8nuisance
already place upon land ownership. 5

real property may be put."9 1

These holdings frame the question of takings in

The wildlife protection cases cited in Sierra Club v.

80. 112 S. CL 2886 (1992)

87 U

81. Id.at 2893 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon. 260 S
158. 160 (1922)1
82. Id.
83. Id.

t

83 See. eq. Barry I Pezshk'. Robert F Housman. In t.z Wair of
Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council A CritLal Leok af Six Osti.ns
PrattitLr.n 5ad & Aihg. 23 ELR 10.003 (1993J- Jill Dickey Protos.
Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council A Trzrmr on ra Reygafory
Ta n..s RtaierScol. 43 COS W RE L Pr-v 6691993 ,

84.Id. at 2899.

89 lxrAs. 112S Ct at2900

85. Id.at 2900 (citation omitted)

90 21Cal App 4th603.613 (lIM33

86. Id. at 2901

91 I
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Department of Forestry include Platt v. Philbrick.9 2 in which

the court held that all private property is subject to the
state police power. The court in SierraClub quotes Platt:
"It is conceivable that private property in every fish and
game district in the state might suffer some damage
through the restrictions of the Fish and Game Code
generally, but this is a damage which the property
owner must bear in the interest of the public welfare" 93 In Christy v. Hodel, also cited in Sierra Club, the
court found that no taking resulted from a regulation
prohibiting a sheepherder from shooting bears which
ate his sheep.94 The court in Sierra Club interpreted the
Hodel and Platt opinions as precedent for its decision
that the owner of a forest inhabited by protected
species is subject to regulations designed with the
legitimate purpose of protecting those species. The
court stated that contemporary wildlife management
and environmental regulation would be difficult if not
impossible if exercise of the state's police power constituted a prima facie unconstitutional taking of the
land inhabited by protected species.95
Most importantly, the Sierra Club court found that
Platt and Christy demonstrate that wildlife protection
regulation historically has been a part of the pre-existing state law of property for purposes of the Lucas takings analysis. 96 As support for its decision, the court
stated that review had been denied in two cases which
similarly rejected plaintiffs' takings arguments.97 The
Sierra Club decision sets an important precedent for
analyzing takings claims under Lucas as the court interpreted the Lucas holding that property rights are limited by "background principles of the State's law of
property" 93 as including principles that are not strictly
laws of real property. Thus, it is necessary to look to
California's background property laws relating to water
rights in evaluating whether the EPA-proposed water
quality standards will constitute a taking.
The background property laws of California, both
common-law and statutory, make clear that California
92. Platt v. Philbrick. 8 Cal. App. 2d 27 (1935).
93, Sierra Club. 21 Cal. App. 4th at 613-14. (quoting Plait, 8 Cal. App.
2dat 31).
94. Id. at 614 (discussing Hodel, 857 F,2d 1324 (9th Cir, 1988)).
95. Id. at 614-15.
96. Id. at 616,
97. Id,; seeSierra Club v. California Coastal Comm'n. 12 Cal. App.
4th 602 (1993). Moerman v California, 17 Cal. App. 4th 452 (1993).
98. Lucas, 112S. Ct at 2900.
99. Id at 2901. SeeLynda G. Cook. Lucas and Endangered Species
L REv. 185 (1993)
Protection:When "Take and 'Takings' Collide. 27 U.C. DAvIS

(arguing that the Endangered Species Act is a codification of background law and thus does not amount to an unconstitutional taking).
100. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
101. People v. Gold Run Ditch Co.. 66 Cal. 138 (1884); Crandall v.
Woods, 8 Cal. 136 (1857).
102. Brian Gray, In Search of Bigfoot: The Common Law Origins of Article
X, Section 2 of the CaliforniaConstitution. 176 LsrINGS Co Sr. L.O. 225, 238
(1989),
103. Sax, supra note 78. at 268.
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water rights are far from absolute. In addition to federal restrictions, state water rights are subject to both
the public trust doctrine and the reasonable and beneficial use requirement of the California Constitution.
Rights to water are, in fact, usufructuary rights to the
use of the water subject to limitations. The EPA-proposed water quality standards merely codify and make
explicit these background limitations. Regulations
which merely codify common law principles do not
trigger a right to compensation under the Takings
Clause. 99
a. The ReasonableUse Requirement
The water rights system in California evolved In a
utilitarian manner as the economic development of
the state required. Water law in California began as a
common law riparian system. The riparian system was
ill-suited to the needs of the state, and appropriative
rights were recognized as hydraulic mining became
increasingly profitable and valuable to the state's
economy.100 As the economic importance of mining
diminished and the resulting damages to the state's
waterways began to hinder other economic activity,
the system evolved to recognize the importance of
both riparian and appropriative rights. 10' Water law
scholars have observed that "[als economic conditions
have changed, and as social goals have evolved, the
Court has not hesitated to modify both the law and the
water rights based on that law to facilitate California's
economic growth and social well-being[," 102 and that
"change is the unchanging chronicle of water jurisprudence." 103 This is possible because California water
rights are subject to the reasonable and beneficial use
requirements of the California Constitution, 104 Article
X, Section 2 provides an overriding constitutional limitation that water use must be "reasonable."' 0' The reasonable and beneficial use requirement is a dynamic
concept which is "variable according to conditions," 06
and which historically has been subject to change with
104. United States v. State Wrater Resources Control Bd, 182

Cal

App. 3d 82 (1986). reh'g denied, petition for reniew denied (1986) iholding State
Water Resources Control Board has authority to enforce water quality
requirements, and has authority to modify prolects' permits; also holding SWRCB to have authority to curtail prolects' diversions of water on
the ground that the prolects' use and diversion of the water had become
unreasonable In light of changed circumstances revealed In new Information; Information regarding the adverse effects of the projects upon
the Delta held to necessitate revised water quality standards)
CoNsr. art. X.§ 2 In pertinent part, this section reads
105. CAL
It is hereby declared that because of the conditions
prevailing in this State the general welfare required that the
water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the
fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste
or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of
water is to be prevented.... The right to water or to the use
or flow of water...shall be limited to such water as shall be
reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and
such right does not and shall not extend to the waste or
unreasonable use or unreasonable method of diversion of
water.
Id.
106. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. 697 F2d 851,
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07
the changing needs of the state.'
Courts have held that "[wlhat constitutes reasonable water use is dependent upon not only the entire
circumstances presented but varies as the current situation changes- and cannot be determined apart from
.statewide considerations of transcendent importance. "1 0 Reasonable uses of water are inextricably
tied to public policy, and thus previously established
relative priorities of right are not controlling in light of
changing definitions of reasonableness.tce Existing
uses of water may be found unreasonable as changing
needs and circumstances change the definition of reasonableness. Water rights historically have been subject to reapportionment to reflect changes In public
policy priorities. Examples of this dynamic are found
in loslin v. Main Municipal Water District"° and United
States v. State Water Resources Control Board.' I
In loslin. the plaintiffs quarried rock and gravel
deposited on their land by the flow of a creek. They had
been engaged in this business for 22 years when the
Main Municipal Water District dammed the creek to
create a reservoir upstream of the quarry. The plaintiffs water right was held to be limited by the constitutional mandate of reasonable use under Article X.
Section 2. The Californis Supreme Court stated that
the question of what is a reasonable use is question
that 'cannot be resolved in vacuo isolated from statewide considerations of transcendent importance.""
The plaintiff's were thus not entitled to any compensation for their loss of water. as their use of water for
gravel quarrying was unreasonable in light of the
Municipal Water District's competing demands for the
water." 3 The supreme court held that the taking of the
water right was justified by Article X, Section 2 of the
California Constitution and was a valid exercise of the
state's police power." 4 In discussing the impact of
loslin, Professor Brian Gray wrote:

Interpreted narrowly. Joslin would be little
more than a statement that egregiously wasteful
uses of water violate Article X. Section 2. Or. the
case may exemplify the balancing of competing
interests required by the Constitution's reasonable use doctrine. Construed broadly. joslin would
stand as a pronouncement that Article X. Section

2 requires all water rights to be exercised in
accordance with contemporary economic conditions and societal values. As these factors change
and new demands for water arise, the state may
adjust existing water rights to accommodate the
relatively more valuable uses of the state's scarce
water resources. i1
Cases decided after lostin indicate that the broad
interpretation is proper. In United States v. State Water
Resources Control Board, which arose out of the state's
efforts to set new water quality standards for the Delta,
the court held that the SWRCB had the power to modify permits for water use under its power, as all water
rights are subject to the overriding constitutional limitation that water use must be reasonable.' 6 The court
interpreted the reasonable use requirement broadly.
finding that 'changed circumstances revealed in new
information about the adverse effects of the projects
upon the Delta necessitated revised water quality
standards' as 'the Projects' use and diversion of the
water had become unreasonable."1"7 The court held
that 'all permits of the projects are subject to the continuing authority of the Board to prevent unreasonable
use.' and that "Idletermination of reasonable use
depends upon the totality of the circumstances presented."' 8 The court further stated that in determining
whether a use is reasonable. 'some accommodation
must be reached concerning the major public interests
at stake. the quality of valuable water resources and
transport of adequate supplies for needs southward.'
and that "ltihe decision is essentially a policy judgment requiring a balancing of the competing public
interests ,19

Water rights established under an earlier prioritization of uses are therefore changeable subject to the
dynamics of societal priorities changing the definition
of reasonableness. In recent times, priorities of use
have expanded to include fish and wildlife preservation and enhancement as reasonable and beneficial
uses. The legislature is authorized to further public
policy by enacting legislation concerning what uses
are reasonable, as long as the legislative enactments
themselves are reasonable. I20 Such legislative defini12
tions are to be given deference in the courts. 1
II 182 Cal App 3d 82 (1936) rzh'g drdL, patilLn for rrufew dmL~d

855 (9th Cir.
1983).
107. Joslin v. Marin Mun Water Dist. 67 Cal 2d 132 (19671 (waler
right previously considered beneflcatlreasonable found to be so no
longer in light of changed circumstances and competing demands, no
"6right to use water except in accordance with reasonablelenelicial
requirements of constitution),
108. United States v State Water Resources Control Bd. 182 Cal
App. 3d at 130 (quoting Environmental Defense Fund v East Bay Mun
Utility Dist.. 26 Cal- 3d 183. 194 (198011.
109. See.e.g. Jostin. 67 Cal 2d at 132. People exrelState Water
Resources Control Bd. v. Foril. 54 Cal App 3d 743 11976) (ordering
users to share equally in construction of a storage system for water
where their use to protect vines from freezing had the effect of only the
upstream user getting water).
110. 67 Cal- 2d 132 (1967).

(19,m)
112 hin.67Cal 2dat 140
113 Id at 137-38
114 L4at 144
115 Gray. supra note l01. at 230
116 Unted States v State Water Resources Control Ed. 182 Cal.
App 3dat 129
117 Id at 130
118 11
119 Id
120 CALCO:Sr art X. § 2
121 California Trout v State Water Resources Control Ed.. 207
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b. The Effect of the Public Trust Doctrine

The public trust doctrine is a fundamental doctrine of property law. 122 it is a servitude which works as
a sort of easement in favor of the public interest in
access to water for traditional public purposes such as
navigation, commerce, and fishing. 23 Protection of the
environment has been recognized as a public trust use
24
for aquarter of a century.
Property rights, including water rights, obtained
from the state are subject to the public trust absent
language in the grant instrument, deed, or lease indicating that the trust has been abrogated.' 25 The holder
can "claim no vested right to bar recognition of the
trust or state action to carry out its purposes." 126 As
such, these rights are subject to termination any time
the use is found to interfere with public trust uses. 127
In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, the

California Supreme Court held that water rights are
subject to the public trust. 128 The supreme court held
that the public trust doctrine provides independent
authority affecting current water law which must be
considered in establishing or evaluating water rights
and allocating water. 29 The supreme court found the
public trust doctrine to be flexible, able to embrace
uses beyond those traditionally recognized, and to
encompass the growing concern for environmental
preservation. 30 in holding that Los Angeles could not
entirely divert streams feeding into Mono Lake (causing the water level of the lake to drop dramatically and
increasing the salinity of the remaining water), the
supreme court held that trust restrictions are applied
not only to diversions and uses of navigable waters
and the lands underlying them, but also to protect
navigable waters from environmental damage caused
by diversions from non-navigable tributaries.'3' In
Audubon, the supreme court held that the public trust
operates to prevent "any party from acquiring a vested
right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to the
interests protected by the public trust." 132 The supreme
court did not, however, hold that the public trust doctrine could be used as a trump over California's water
rights system. Rather, the public trust doctrine was

held to co-exist with the existing water rights system.133
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The details of how this co-existence would operate were not laid out in this case. Later cases provide
some indication as to how the public trust doctrine
and the water rights system work together. For exampie, in United States v. State Water Resources Control
Board,' 34 consistency with the public trust doctrine was
included in the court's reasonable use analysis. The
court held that public trust uses must be balanced
with water quality interests, water supply interests,
and other factors in determining reasonableness
under Article X, Section 2.
This view of the public trust doctrine was developed and applied in Environmental Defense Fund v. East
Bay Municipal Utility District. 135 in that case, the defendant sought to divert water upstream of a stretch of
the American River which supports a multitude of fish,
wildlife, and vegetation species, and an Important
public recreational area. This case was decided by the
Superior Court on remand from the California
Supreme Court. In remanding this case, the supreme
court held that the courts and the SWRCB had the
authority under Article X, Section 2 to direct an appropriator to move its point of diversion downrlver for the
purpose of protecting instream uses of the river below
the existing point of diversion. 36 The Superior Court
held it was necessary to balance the public trust uses
of environmental protection and public recreation
against the interests of the public served by the utility
district in a reasonably inexpensive and clean water
supply. The court permitted the utility district's diversion provided that downstream flows were maintained
in sufficient amounts to support the fish, wildlife, vegetation, and recreational area, thereby fulfilling the
137
public trust servitude.
3. Balancing the Interests-The Need for a
Physical Solution
The reasonable use requirement of Article X,
Section 2 and the public trust doctrine are background
principles of California's property law; combined, they
render water rights usufructuary, qualified by the
requirements of the doctrines. Thus, the EPA-proposed standards do not, under Lucas, effect a prima
facie taking. Rather, the Lucas balancing test Is to be

Cal. App. 3d 585, 622-25 (1989)

130. Id.at 434-35 (citing Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal, 3d 259-60)

122. Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of
American Property Law. 19 ENVrL L. 515 (1989).

131. Id.at 437.

123. Id.
124. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251 (1971).
125. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419,
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
126. Id. at 440.
127. Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148 (1928). In this case, plalntlff
obtained a lease from state for an oil well on submerged land on the
condition that If the use was found to Interfere with navigation or fishIng., the well would be shut down.
128. National Audubon Society, 33 Cal. 3d at 445-46.
129. Id.

132. Id.at 445.
133. Id.
134. United States v. State Water Resources Control Idc, 182 Cal.
App. 3d 82 (1986). reh'g denied, petition for review denied, (1986).
135. Cal. Superior Court, Alameda County, Docket No 425955
(unpublished opinion filed Jan. 2, 1990).
136. Environmental Defense Fund v, East Bay Mun. Utility Dist., 26
Cal. 3d 183 (1980).
137. Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Mun, Utility Dist.,
Cal. Superior Court, Alameda County, Docket No. 425955 (unpublished
opinion filed Jan. 2, 1990).
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applied.'3
The Lucas test requires the balancing of the value
of the claimant's use. the degree of harm caused by
that use, and the avoidability of that harm.' 39 Cases
concerning restrictions on coal mining illustrate the
application of this test. Although decided five years
before Lucas. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
DeBenedictis is an example of a challenge to a regulatory limitation on the use of a natural resource In which
the court balanced the same factors the Lucas Court
later deemed important. 40 In Keystone. the Court
addressed a claim that a regulation restricting coal
mining in sensitive areas, aimed at the prevention of
land subsidence, effected a taking.' 4' The Court balanced the private right of the coal company to maintain its business and the benefit to the public of an
available coal supply against the harm done to the
land by the mining and the fact that further harm was
unavoidable if unrestricted mining was allowed to continue in the sensitive areas.' 42 The Court held that the
regulation did not constitute an unconstitutional taking as no private owner has the right to use property in
a manner harmful to the public good. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the regulation (i.e.. providing for the conservation of surface land) was justified.
and that the regulation did not make it entirely impossible for the plaintiffs to profitably engage in their
business, as mining was not restricted to the extent
143
that it was made 'commercially impracticable".
In applying this balancing test to the possible
takings problem presented by the EPA-proposed water
quality standards (the effect of which will be felt mainly by agricultural users), the value of the agricultural
uses and their suitability to the region must be balanced against the harm to public resources caused by
those uses and the relative ease with which the harm
can be avoided through measures taken by the
claimant and the government.' 44 It is extremely difficult to weigh the enormous economic value of agriculture to California (not to mention the value of abundant and inexpensive produce) against the environmental good achieved by increased Delta outflows.
Thus. the possiblility of avoiding the harm caused by
agricultural use of water is a key factor in this balancing.
138. Lucas. 112 S.

Ct at 2893. 2901; supra text accompanying

notes

85-87.
139. Id.
140. Keystone Butemlnous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis. 480 US
470(1987).
141. Id.at 475-476.
142. Id.at 485.

California water law historically has been utilitarian In nature and receptive to physical solutions to
such dilemmas. 143 Courts have regularly held that a
scarcity of water necessitating its optimal utilization
justifies the "taking of a senior water right and compensating the holder of that right with a physical solution. 146 For example, the Imperial Irrigation District's
excessive water deliveries to agricultural users was
found to be wasting large amounts of water and causIng environmental damage in the Salton Sea."47 The
SWRCB simply could have rescinded the districts
water right as its use was unreasonable and wasteful.
Instead, since much of the excess water could be conserved through a combination of operational and
physical Improvements to the delivery systems 48 the
Metropolitan Water District was allowed to make these
Improvements and use the water conserved.' 49 In predicting the Increased use of physical solutions,
Professor Dunning observed:
As the pace of large-scale water development projects In the West slows, and as we
are increasingly forced to look to mechanisms other than new water supply projects
to balance supply and demand, the physical
solution will likely become ever more important in western water law.' 5 0
Colorado's use of a physical solution to its
groundwater depletion problem is an example of a
state addressing a scarcity problem in this way.
Colorado Initially tried to solve its groundwater scarcity problem by ordering its state engineer to strictly
enforce the state's prior appropriation system.' Strict
enforcement, although constitutional, would have
involved shutting down thousands of wells, thereby
causing severe economic dislocation. There was strong
opposition to this plan and administrative difficulties
in Implementing It." 2 The Colorado legislature then
enacted comprehensive water legislation more oriented to physical solutions." 3 The policy goal was to protect senior rights holders without displacing the junior
rights holders."54 The means to that end included limiting the rights of senior rights holders to reasonable
methods of diversion and allowing junior rights hold578 (1971). People o rd/L
Stale Water Resources Control d v, Forni. 54
CaL App 3d 743 (1976). Lcdi v East Bay Mun. Utility Dist.. 7 CaL 2d 316
(1936)
147. STATE
WATErn
fRsouxces Co:rrLB..,"
D

o No. 1600 (1984).

148 I at 3
149 Sa MARC REISNER & SARA BrATES. OVERTAPPED OASIS.
149-65(1989)

143. Id. at 485-486, 491-492.

150 Dunning, supra note 144. at 448 (footnotes omritted).

144. LUCAS.
112 S. CL at 2901.

151- Li-at 465

145. SeeHarrison C. Dunning. The PhysicalSolution in wetem Waer
Law 57 U. CoLO. L REy. 445 (19861.
146. See. e.g.. Erickson v. Oueen Valley Ranch Co.. 22 Cal App, 3d

152, ld at 465-466
153 L at 466
154 L4 at467
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ers to initiate and implement plans that used innovative approaches to efficient delivery and conservation
of water. These innovations included pooling of water
resources, water exchange projects, substitute supplies of water, and development of new water
sources.155
Application of physical solutions in the Central
Valley could mitigate the impact of the EPA-proposed
water quality standards on the agricultural economy.
Physical solutions could include the following: limiting rights holders to reasonable uses and methods of
use (such as water-efficient crops and efficient delivery
and irrigation); allowing water pooling agreements
and exchange programs; subsidizing the application of
existing conservation technologies (such as drip irrigation and improved sprinkler systems) for those uses
which are found to be reasonable and sufficiently valuable to justify the cost; and, providing incentives to
encourage development of new conservation technologies. A combination of legislative definitions of
reasonable uses and methods of use, subsidies, and
market-based incentives would allow reasonable agricultural uses to continue, thus minimizing economic
impacts while conserving water for increased Delta
outflows.

155. Id. at 467-468 (citing CoLO. REv.STAT.§ 37-92-103(9) (Supp.
1986)).
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